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ABSTRACT 
This exploration of citizen viewpoints on energy policy uses a clustering technique to analyze 101 Q-sorts 
obtained from a diverse national sample in April 1979. 
The results indicate an approximate  consensus.  The predominant  themes in the core viewpoint and three 
peripheral variations are resistance to energy price increases and concern for public health, safety, and the 
environment ,  particularly in connection with nuclear power plants. There is also widespread distrust of the 
oil and gas industry, local utilities, the President, government  generally, and energy experts, coupled with 
disbelief, distrust, disaffection, and undertones of moral outrage. The existence of this approximate 
consensus is less surprising than the absence of shared viewpoints that are independent or opposed to it. 
Individual interpretations of the main themes are explored through unstructured, follow-up interviews with 
the best representatives of the core viewpoint. 
The evolution of shared viewpoints has been shaped by specific events such as Three Mile Island and by 
recurring events, particularly chronic energy price increases and intermittent shortages, and the ongoing 
national debate on energy policy. In our interpretation, the social tension and personal insecurities 
accumulated as a result of  the energy situation are potentially destabilizing. However, the potential for rapid 
change in citizen viewpoints has so far been blocked by perceptual and political rigidities that underlie an 
approximate stalemate in Washington.  
The concluding section presents some suggestions for dealing with the perceptual, political, and moral 
aspects of the situation. 
I. Introduction 
Our inability to realize satisfactory progress toward a sustainable energy future has 
been attributed to the energy policy process and, often indirectly, to our institutions of 
government,  law and politics. F rom one perspective, the political system enables 
special interests and a recalcitrant public to frustrate the adoption of rational and 
comprehensive policies developed by experts in the federal government. From 
* We would like to thank Gerald A. Cole for his contr ibutions to the initial phases of this study, and The 
University of  Michigan for financial support .  An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 25th 
Annual  Meeting of the American Nuclear Society, June  5, 1979, in Atlanta. 
0032-2687/80/0000-0000/$02.25 9 1980 Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company  
148 
another, the political system enables the public and the federal government to inhibit 
the development of efficient market solutions. A closer look at citizen viewpoints on 
energy policy, and their role in the policy process, sheds some light on these diagnoses. 
A citizen's viewpoint on a public issue such as energy policy is an evolving pattern 
among an indefinite number  of attitudes and opinions. Direct or mediated experience 
may induce shifts in the direction or intensity of a few of these predispositions relative 
to others, and thereby create stresses toward adjustment elsewhere in the pattern. Each 
change in the overall pattern redefines the meanings of  the particular attitudes and 
opinions included within it. 
Which predispositions change significantly in terms of intensity, direction, or 
meaning depends upon many factors? At one extreme are the primitive needs of the 
personality left over from earliest childhood. At the other are events on a global scale, 
such as changes in the production and price of  Middle Eastern crude oil. What results 
f rom the interplay of such factors is a citizen's viewpoint that is ultimately unique, but 
which is similar in some degree to the viewpoints of others. 
The function of promotional  politics is to intensify, coordinate, and redefine certain 
predispositions on a selective basis, in order to mobilize support. The extent to which 
promotional  efforts succeed or fail, given competing efforts and unplanned events, is a 
matter of overriding importance for public policy, as the diagnoses sketched above 
suggest: Widespread public opposition may render the efforts of policy planners 
politically infeasible or (if adopted) ineffective. 
Our purpose here is to explore citizen viewpoints and their interaction with elite 
perspectives in the energy policy process; and to suggest the need to rethink energy 
policy planning as a means of coping with subjective differences. 
For this study, in April 1979 we asked 101 citizens nationwide to express their 
viewpoints on energy policy. Through a procedure known as Q-technique [1 ], each 
sorted a sample of 48 statements culled from public discourse on the issue and selected 
according to a theoretical f ramework [2]. In contrast to the more familiar sample 
surveys, this technique is relatively specialized to the identification of shared 
viewpoints, and to qualitative questions of intensity, direction, and meaning in each of 
them. We used cluster analysis [3], a form of numerical taxonomy, to analyze the data. 
In addition, we conducted follow-up, unstructured interviews with the best represen- 
tatives of these viewpoints in June 1979. 
The results reveal only one basic, shared viewpoint on energy policy among these 
respondents, although certain variations are distinguishable. As in any approximate  
consensus, individual interpretations of  the main propositions differ in some ways. 
The predominant  themes are resistance to energy price increases and concern for 
public health, safety, and the environment, particularly in connection with nuclear 
power plants. There is also widespread distrust of the oil and gas industry, local 
utilities, the President, and energy experts, coupled with disbelief, disorientation, 
disaffection, and undertones of moral outrage. The existence of this approximate  
consensus is less surprising than the absence of shared viewpoints that are independent 
or opposed to it. 
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The evolution of shared viewpoints on energy policy has been shaped by specific 
events such as the incident at Three Mile Island and by recurring events, particularly 
chronic energy price increases and intermittent shortages, and the ongoing national 
energy policy debate. In our interpretation, the social tension and personal insecurities 
accumulated as a result of the energy situation are potentially destabilizing. However, 
the potential for rapid change in citizen viewpoints has so far been blocked by 
perceptual and political rigidities that underlie an approximate stalemate in 
Washington. The concluding section presents some suggestions for dealing with the 
perceptual, political, and moral aspects of the situation. 
II. Methods 
For those readers unfamiliar with the methods used here, a digression is in order. 
Other readers are encouraged to proceed to the next section. 
Q-techniques, as we have noted, are appropriate for discovering the number and 
content of shared viewpoints. A shared viewpoint is a pattern of many attitudes and 
opinions organized into a coherent whole by like-minded individuals. Through the 
University Survey Research Center we contacted a diverse (but not random) set of 
101 respondents. Each respondent was asked to model his or her viewpoint on energy 
by sorting48 statements, each typed on a separate card, according to relative intensity 
and direction (agreement or disagreement). More specifically, each respondent did a 
preliminary sorting of the statements by agreement, disagreement, or relative 
indifference. The few statements agreed with most intensely were then placed at the +5 
extreme of a continuum; the few statements disagreed with most intensely were placed 
at the -5 extreme; and sorting continued in this manner, alternating from one side to 
the other, until all of the remaining statements were located with respect to each other. 
The result is a Q-sort, in which intensity and direction are given directly by the 
respondent. Meanings imputed to any particular statement by a respondent can be 
inferred from the overall pattern. 
From the Q-sort provided by each respondent we formed the matrix of distances 
between each pair of respondents i andj. Distance was defined as di, j = 1 - ri,j, where ri, j 
is the product-moment  correlation between their Q-sorts with each statement 
weighted equally. The average linkage method was used to form clusters of 
respondents who share in some degree the same viewpoint. In this procedure, each 
respondent is initially construed as a single-member cluster. Then the two clusters (or 
respondents) separated by the smallest distance are joined to form a two-member 
cluster. In the next and all succeeding operations, the two clusters separated by the 
smallest average distances between all pairs of their members are joined. In the final 
operation, all respondents are joined in one cluster. 
The non-random sampling procedure entailed sociodemographic quotas assigned to 
each of seventeen interviewers. It does not permit estimates of the proportion of the 
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national population that holds a particular opinion or viewpoint. Together with the 
clustering techniques, however, it is sufficiently sensitive to signal the existence of any 
shared viewpoint in the population represented by several or more of the respondents. 
Diversity rather than randomness is the most appropriate sampling objective for this 
purpose. 
III. An Approximate Consensus 
The organization of viewpoints is summarized in Fig. I. Each point along the 
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X 28 42 .54 
X.I 8 39 .55 
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Fig. 1. Organization of viewpoints. 
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the width of a cluster reflects the number of respondents included within it. The 
vertical axis is scaled in steps, which indicate the point in the clustering procedure at 
which the various clusters formed. The steps are numbered f rom 100 to 1, bo t tom to 
top, in reverse of the sequence of operations. Through  this convention, the step 
numbers indicate the number  of clusters remaining at each point in the sequence. 
From the start of the procedure to the conclusion, the clusters become increasingly 
heterogeneous with respect to the viewpoints of the respondents included within them. 
The table in Fig. 1 gives the average distances between all pairs of members of the two 
clusters joined to form X, X.l ,  X.2, X.3, and the final cluster, along with the step at 
which the component  clusters joined and cluster size. 
Figure 1 indicates that there exists only one basic, shared viewpoint among these 
respondents with respect to the 48 statements. The respondents in cluster X are the 
core representatives of this viewpoint. The respondents in the other distinguishable 
clusters - X. 1, X.2, and X.3 - share related but peripheral viewpoints. The viewpoints 
of the other respondents are idiosyncratic. The key point is that no shared viewpoint 
independent of the core viewpoint or opposed to it emerged from the data. 
No other cluster rivals the core cluster X in terms of the homogeneity and the 
number of respondent viewpoints included within it. It is comprised of 28 respondents, 
over a quarter of the total. At the same level of homogeneity, only one of the 41 other 
clusters remaining at this step (a subset of X.2) includes as many as six respondent 
viewpoints. The others include four or less. Moreover,  the remaining distinguishable 
clusters comprising at least 5% of the respondents merge with X on the basis of 
relatively small average distances. Consider, for example, the worst case. At step 22 
where the X.3 cluster (n ---- 16) merges with the augmented core cluster (n = 52), the 
distance measure indicates that the average correlation among the 16 X 52 = 832 pairs 
of respondent viewpoints between the two clusters is 0.35. The viewpoints included in 
X.3 are, on average, more similar to the viewpoints in the augmented core cluster than 
to the relatively idiosyncratic viewpoints in the 21 other clusters comprised of 33 
respondents remaining at this step. The latter join the augmented core cluster at large 
distances. 
The conclusion that there exists only one shared viewpoint, organized into core and 
peripheral variations, is supported by the pattern of correlations among cluster 
profiles. A cluster profile is the average score (or rank) of each of the 48 statements 
assigned by members of the cluster. It can be interpreted as the Q-sort that would have 
been provided by an "ideal" or "perfect" representative of the shared viewpoint. The 
averaging procedure used to form cluster profiles suppresses the dispersion of 
statement scores (or ranks) among cluster members. I f  the shared viewpoints were 
independent, the correlation between their cluster profiles would be approximately 
zero. I f  the shared viewpoints were opposed or polarized, the correlation between their 
cluster profiles would be negative. As shown in Table 1 the correlations between the 
profiles are consistently high and positive. X is not only the most homogeneous cluster 
of respondents, as we have seen; its profile is also highly correlated with the average 
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] 'ABLE l 
Correlations Among Cluster Profiles 
Clusters X X.1 X.2 X.3 All Rs 
X 1.00 
X.l 0.76 1.00 
X.2 0.72 0.52 1.00 
X.3 0.72 0.72 0.46 1.00 
All Rs 0.96 0.83 0.71 0.84 1.00 
viewpoint in the peripheral clusters and with the average viewpoint in the sample as a 
whole. 
Before turning to the content of core and peripheral viewpoints, it is worthwhile to 
examine alternative explanations. The structure of the data may not be the best 
explanation for the emergence of only one shared viewpoint in several variations. One 
alternative explanation is that the organization of viewpoints summarized in Fig. 1 is 
an artifact of the average linkage method. The best test of this possibility is to apply the 
complete linkage (or farthest neighbor) method to the same data. Under this method: 
When two clusters join, their similarity is that existing between the farthest pair of members, one in each 
cluster. The method will generally lead to tight, hyperspherical, discrete clusters that join only with 
difficulty and at relative low overall similarity values [4]. 
With these data the complete linkage method does produce relatively discrete clusters 
that join late in the procedure at the lower-numbered steps. However, the classifica- 
tion of respondents produced by this method is similar to the classification produced 
by the average linkage method for these data. And the cluster profiles reveal that the 
statements having rather high positive and negative mean scores are the same 
statements that anchor the cluster profiles produced by the average linkage method. In 
other words, profiles of the clusters generated by the two methods are quite similar. 
Another alternative explanation is that the organization of viewpoints summarized 
in Fig. 1 is an artifact of the particular opinions included in the sample of 48 
statements. More specifically, the possibility exists that the sample of statements is 
biased in the direction of highly consensual statements. There are inherent difficulties 
in testing this alternative because the universe of possible statements is essentially 
unbounded, and because there is no nonarbitrary standard to distinguish a biased 
from an unbiased sample. However, we applied the average linkage method to the data 
set that excluded the six statements having the highest mean scores (positive or 
negative direction) in the cluster of all respondents. The classification of respondents 
and the organization of viewpoints is quite similar to that summarized in Fig. 1. In 
short, deleting the most consensual statements from the sample of 48 statements 
makes little difference. 
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A third alternative explanation is that the organization of viewpoints is an artifact 
of the set of 101 respondents interviewed for this study. In the absence of other 
collections of respondents interviewed in the same way at the same time, little can be 
said conclusively. Interviewers were instructed to select respondents according to 
diversity of sociodemographic characteristics in order to minimize the possibility that 
any significant viewpoint existing in the population would go undetected. The 
procedures used here are sufficiently sensitive to detect the existence of an independent 
or opposed viewpoint if only several representatives of the viewpoint are included [5]. 
The organization of viewpoints that emerges f rom these data represents an 
approximate  consensus on the intensity and direction of a number  of energy-related 
attitudes and opinions, but not necessarily on their meanings. In this instance, as in 
legislatures, markets, and other political and social settings, agreement among a 
number of people on a set of proposit ions masks a variety of differences among 
individual interpretations of the propositions and the reasons for accepting them. 
Under these circumstances, interpretation reflects one's observational standpoint, and 
no single interpretation, including the interpretation of the analyst, is exhaustive. 
IV. The Shared Viewpoints: Core and Periphery 
Recall that a cluster profile is formed by averaging the scores (or ranks) assigned to 
each statement by members of the cluster. As a result of this operation, the statements 
that are matters of importance and consensus turn out to have the most extreme 
scores, tending toward +5 and 5. The 13 statements having the most extreme mean 
scores (greater than 12.51) in the core viewpoint profile are reproduced in Table 2. The 
other 35 statements, with means tending toward zero, are either relatively insignificant 
or relatively controversial among members of the core cluster. 
As we have already suggested, interpretation of this shared viewpoint (or any other) 
is by no means straightforward. On the one hand, a number of plausible themes may 
be woven among the various combinations of two or more statements. On the other, 
each statement may have a number  of connotations depending upon the context of 
other statements with which it is associated. The process is inherently open-ended. 
Here we begin the process by starting with the manifest content of the viewpoint 
profile, and in particular with the statements having the highest degree of significance 
and consensus. 
Core Viewpoint 
Respondents in the core cluster object most strongly to the location of new nuclear 
power plants in the areas where they live (16.__a, -4.1). However, there is very little 
consensus on the broader issues of whether the nation needs more nuclear power or 
whether federal subsidies for nuclear power are appropriate  (see statements 24 and 12 
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TABLE 2 
Cluster X Profile: The Most Significant and Consensual Statements* 
Most disagree Most agree 
16. 1 have no objections to the location of a 
new nuclear power plant in the area where 
I live. 
(-4. I~ -0.9, -4.7, • 
30..~ We should accept additional risks to public 
health and safety in order to deal with the 
energy crisis. 
(-4.0_..~,-3.5,-3.9, 1.6) 
26. Consumer  prices of gasoline, natural gas, 
fuel oil and electricity are too low. 
(-3.8.,..~, 1 .9,0.0,-2.9)  
47. The oil and gas companies deserve the trust 
of people like me. 
(-3.4..__ z, 2.3,-1.6,  1.4) 
1. Over the next twenty years, solar energy just 
can't make much difference in meeting the 
nation's energy needs. 
( -3.2.._. d, 0.0, - 1.0, -3.5) 
43.1 won't cut back on my energy use until 
others make the same sacrifice. 
( 2.7_.__ z -0.1, -2.6, -2.6) 
34.,.. a An increase in gas and electric bills means 
more hardship for the poor and those on fixed 
incomes. 
(+3.7, +4.1, +2,6, +2.3) 
33. Not even the experts know how to safely 
dispose of radioactive wastes from nuclear 
power plants. 
(+3.4.__. z +3.1, +3.7, +1.3) 
6.. a Energy research and development should 
emphasize renewable energy sources like solar 
energy. 
(+3.3__= +3.1, +3.9, +3.9) 
8. We should do whatever we can to make our 
j'obs and incomes less dependent on foreign oil. 
(+3.3..._., +3.1, +3.0, -t-3.4) 
46. Oil and natural gas have been withheld 
from the market to force consumer price 
increases. 
(+3.3_... d, +2.8, +0.3, +2.7) 
18.1 want better information about how the 
energy crisis affects me and my community,  
and what we can do about it. 
(4-2.6.......,,-t-2.0, +1.1, +1.9) 
35. I don't  know whom or what to believe 
about the energy situation9 
(+2.5__,+2.0, 0.3, 0.2) 
* The figures in parentheses are cluster means for clusters X. X. l, X.2, and X.3, respectively. Means for 
cluster X are underscored. 
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in the Appendix). Opposi t ion to the siting of nuclear power plants in nearby areas 
appears to be the focal point of health and safety concerns. These respondents reject 
the proposition that we should accept additional risks to public health and safety in 
order to deal with the energy crisis (30, 4.0); and they believe that not even the experts 
know how to safely dispose of radioactive wastes from nuclear power plants (33, 
+3.4). 
These respondents express substantial support  for solar energy. The}' agree that 
renewable energy sources including solar should be emphasized in energy research and 
development (6_ +3.3); and they reject the proposition that solar energy cannot make 
much difference in meeting the nation's energy needs over the next twenty years (1_ 
-3.2). Other sources of supply are less significant, although modest support  exists for 
increasing the domestic production of oil and gas and for the commercialization of 
synthetic fuels (App. 10, 25). These views on supply may be related to expressed 
support  for the goal of reducing the dependence of our jobs and incomes on foreign oil 
(8, +3.3). 
While the emphasis appears to be on ensuring supplies of energy (subject to 
environmental  constraints), there are also signs of support for reducing demand. 
These respondents reject nonconservation by others as a reason for not conserving 
themselves (43, -2.7); and the}, express a modest degree of support for the goal of 
nurturing a resource-conserving ethic (App. 1_3.). 
Energy prices are significant primarily in terms of the hardships the}' impose on the 
poor and those on fixed incomes (34._._, +3.7). Some of the respondents may include 
themselves among those who have experienced such economic hardships, even if they 
are not poor or living on fixed incomes. They reject the proposit ion that consumer 
prices of energy are too low (26, -3.8), a proposition that is the cornerstone of energy 
policy in the Carter Administration. There is no systematic support  for either the 
policy of oil and gas price decontrol; or the expectation that decontrol will lead to fair 
and efficient allocation through the market; or the belief that energy price increases are 
necessary to ensure adequate supplies (App. 28, 3, 22). All of these are among the 
justifications for price increases in Washington. Consumer price increases are 
interpreted in part as the result of oil and gas being withheld f rom the market  (46__ 
+3.3). 
The viewpoint is also marked by widespread distrust: Those who share it disagree on 
average that the oil and gas companies deserve the trust of"people  like me" (47_.__, -3.4); 
that the local gas and electric companies will do what is best for "all of us"; and to a 
lesser extent that "people like me" should trust the President to find a solution to the 
energy crisis. Moreover,  they believe that people who direct their hostility toward 
business or government are not  just looking for scapegoats. On the positive side is a 
modest degree of support  for organizations that work for consumer interests in energy 
issues (App. 5, 38, 48, 32). 
Related to these manifestations of distrust is a lack of credibility and a demand for 
better information. Most of these respondents do not know who or what to believe 
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about  the energy situation (35_..z +2.5). There is no systematic support for a greater 
effort by the federal government to sell its energy policy proposals to the public, or for 
the idea that the truth about the energy crisis is difficult to convey to the public(App. 
40, 17). But these respondents do want better information about how the energy crisis 
affects them and their communities, and what they can do about it (18__ z +2.6). 
A general pattern is apparent  in the core viewpoint profile. It is a selective emphasis 
on those aspects of the energy situation that pertain to the immediate circumstances of 
the respondents or others like them. Note, for example, that the significance of energy 
price increases, nuclear power, and other energy issues is construed primarily in terms 
of impacts on individual citizens and the areas where they live. These impacts include 
health and safety, economic hardships, job and income security, distrust, disorienta- 
tion, and a sense of unfair treatment. 
At the same time, the national implications of these issues are generally discounted. 
Whether the nation needs energy price increases or nuclear power, and the possible 
T A B L E 3  
PeripheralClusterProfi les:DifferencesinPriorit ies  
Core profile Peripheral profiles 
X 
Rank St. Mean 
X.1 X.2 X.3 
St. Mean St. Mean St. Mean 
1 34 +3.7 45* +4.3 13" +4.7  6 +3.9  
2 33 +3.4 34 +4. l 12 * +4.4 4 +3.6 
3 6 +3.3 29* +3.3 6 +3.9 8 +3.4 
4 8 +3.3 6 +3. 1 41 +3.9 29* +3.3 
5 46 +3.3 8 +3.1 33 +3.7 45* +2.8 
6 18 +2.6 9* +3.1 8 +3.0 46 +2.7 
7 35 +2.5 33 +3.1 15* +3.0 24* +2.5 
8 4 +2.4 10" 4-2.8 34 +2.6 - 
9 32 +2.3 46 +2.8 
10 41 +2.3 - 
40 27 2.1 - 
41 2 2.3 48* -2.5 43 -2.6 
42 5 -2.4 28* 2.6 38* 2.7 - 
43 43 2.7 3* -2.9 36* -2.9 
44 1 3.2 5 -2.9 5 3.1 5 -2.6 
45 47 3.4 2 -3.4 2 -3.3 43 -2.6 
46 26 3.8 30 3:5 30 -3.9 21" 2.8 
47 30 -4.0 27 -3.8 24* 4.4 26 2.9 
48 16 -4.1 38* -3.9 16 4.7 1 -3.5 
* Indicates that the statement is n o t  among those statements in the X profile 
that have a mean greater than 12.01. 
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reasons why, are either relatively insignificant or are controversial. These national 
implications are of course remote with respect to individual experience. There is a 
tendency to discount the observations and interpretations circulated by government 
and business, which are not generally perceived as trustworthy sources on the national 
interest in energy policy. People appear  to rely on their own personal observations and 
interpretations [6]. 
In short, the energy situation from the viewpoint of these citizens is quite different 
f rom the one pictured in corporate headquarters or in Washington. We shall return to 
this pattern in a later section. 
Peripheral Viewpoints 
Differences in priorities among the representatives of the peripheral viewpoints are 
summarized by statement numbers, and means in Table 3. Table 3 includes all 
statements in the three peripheral viewpoints having means greater than]2.5]. Most of 
these statements are also among the most significant statements in the core viewpoint. 
The exceptions are noted with an asterisk. Statements referred to in Table 3 are 
reproduced in the Appendix. 
The X.1 viewpoint is marked by a greater emphasis on national energy policy, but 
the direction of opinion is generally the same as in the core viewpoint. The people who 
share this peripheral viewpoint support  a windfall profits tax and horizontal 
divestiture of the major oil companies (45, 29); and they reject decontrol of oil and gas 
prices, and the supporting expectation that decontrol would lead to fair and efficient 
allocation through the market (28, 3). Hardships created by energy price increases 
appear  to be among the reasons (34). Concern for public health and safety is also 
found in this viewpoint (30, 33), but it is not focused on nuclear power (16). Distrust is 
heightened in this viewpoint, but the focus is shifted primarily to the President, the 
experts, and local utilities (38, 27, and5) .  These respondents agree that "people like 
me" are ignored when big business and big government make energy policy in 
Washington (,2). The general impression is that in this viewpoint, as opposed to the 
core viewpoint, distrust is expressed in opposition to federal policies that would 
permit or increase"market"  control over energy at the perceived expense of the public. 
The X.2 viewpoint is marked by an enhanced concern for environmental protection 
(30, 41, and 33) and energy conservation. These respondents strongly endorse the goal 
of nurturing a resource-conserving ethic (13), oppose the promotion of energy 
consumption through advertising (15), and reject one of the rationalizations for not 
cutting back on personal energy consumption (43). Concerns for environmental 
protection and conservation appear  to be focused in a rejection of nuclear power, both 
in the areas where the respondents live (16) and as an energy alternative supported by 
the federal government (12). They strongly agree that the nation does have alternatives 
to increased dependence on nuclear power (24). These themes can be discerned in the 
core viewpoint, but they are enhanced and generalized here. The major difference 
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between the core viewpoint and the X.2 viewpoint is that the latter shows little concern 
for energy prices (26). Incidentally, representatives of both the X. 1 and X.2 viewpoints 
reject the threat or use of military force if an energy crisis is imposed on them (2). 
The X.3 viewpoint is less homogeneous than the others. It is marked by the strongest 
support  for both solar energy and for nuclear power, and by the least support  for 
environmental  protection. In the case of nuclear power, there is little consensus on the 
location of a nuclear power plant in the areas where these respondents live (16), but 
they do believe that the nation must increase its dependence on nuclear power (24), 
and there is some support  for federal subsidies (12). The most important  concern 
appears to he anxiety over the world energy situation (4), and its threat to their jobs 
and incomes. This theme is apparent  in the core viewpoint, but magnified in 
significance here. 
Sociodemographic Characteristics 
The sociodemographic characteristics of the respondents, including the others 
(unclassified), are summarized in Table 4. These distributions refer to the set of 
respondents and not to the population at large. 
In general, there are few differences among the cluster members. In terms of age 
cohorts, the distribution of cluster members departs only slightly from the distribution 
expected on the basis of relative cluster size. The distribution by sex conforms even 
more closely to the expected distribution. (Other studies have shown a tendency for 
women to prefer anti-nuclear and pro-environment positions over men. These positions 
are most apparent  in the core cluster X and the peripheral cluster X.2, as we have 
seen.) At least one respondent from each of the broad regional classifications is a 
member  of each of the clusters. I f  regional differences are important  in the population, 
such differences are not apparent among these respondents. 
Differences do appear, however, with respect to education. The members of the X.2 
cluster, the most strongly anti-nuclear and pro-environment,  are the most highly 
educated. Five of the seven have done graduate work, and none have only 13 years of 
education or less. The members of the core cluster have the next most education, and 
the members of the X.I and X.3 clusters have the least. 
The respondents who hold the more idiosyncratic viewpoints, and are therefore 
unclassified, are disproportionately less educated and more elderly. Nine of the 13 
respondents aged 66 and over (or 69%) are among the unclassified. Twenty-nine of the 
respondents with 13 years of education or less (or 51%) are among the unclassified. 
V. Individual Interpretations 
Individual interpretations of a shared viewpoint can be clarified through unstruc- 
tured, follow-up interviews with the best representatives. The best representatives are 
TABLE 4 
Sociodemographic Description of the Respondents by Cluster 
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X X.I X.2 X.3 Others Totals 
Age 
35 or less 
36 50 
51 65 
66 or more 
No report 
Sex 
t0 2 3 6 8 29 
7 3 2 4 l0 26 
7 3 2 6 13 31 
4 9 13 
M ale 13 3 3 7 18 44 
Female 13 5 4 9 22 53 
No report 2 2 4 
Education (Years) 
13 or less 12 5 11 29 57 
14 16 1 l 3 2 4 9 29 
17 or more 5 5 I 2 13 
No report 2 2 
Region 
East 13 4 4 7 25 53 
South 5 I 1 5 6 18 
West [0 3 2 4 7 30 
Totals 28 8 7 16 42 101 
t hose  r e s p o n d e n t s  w h o s e  Q - s o r t s  have  the  h ighes t  c o r r e l a t i o n s  wi th  the  v i e w p o i n t  
profi le .  I n t e r v i e w s  wi th  f o u r  o f  the  best  r ep re sen t a t i ve s  of  the  co re  v i e w p o i n t  are  
s u m m a r i z e d  in t.his sec t ion  [7]. As  s h o w n  in T a b l e  5, the i r  Q - s o r t s  a re  also pos i t ive ly  
c o r r e l a t e d  wi th  the  p e r i p h e r a l  v i e w p o i n t  prof i les .  T h e  in t e rv iews  were  u n s t r u c t u r e d  in 
tha t  the  r ep re sen t a t i ve s  were  s imp ly  e n c o u r a g e d  to ta lk  a b o u t  the  energy  s i t ua t i on  
wi th  a m i n i m u m  o f  spec i f ic  a n d  s u b s t a n t i v e  cues  f r o m  the  in t e rv iewer .  Because  the  
i n t e rv i ews  were  c o n d u c t e d  a b o u t  two  m o n t h s  a f te r  the  Q-sor t s ,  they  p r o v i d e  
i n f o r m a t i o n  a b o u t  the  d i r ec t ions  o f  e v o l u t i o n  o f  v i e w p o i n t s  as well  as po ten t i a l l y  
c o r r o b o r a t i n g  i n f o r m a t i o n  f r o m  an  a l t e r n a t i v e  o b s e r v a t i o n a l  s t andpo in t .  
Mrs .  A is a 52-yea r -o ld ,  midd le -c lass  housewi fe ,  w h o  has a h igh  s choo l  e d u c a t i o n  
and  l ives in a s u b u r b  o f  a la rge  M i d w e s t e r n  city. O f  al l  the  r e s p o n d e n t s ,  she is the  best  
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  o f  the  c o r e  v i e w p o i n t .  Mrs .  A a c k n o w l e d g e s  tha t  as a l a y m a n  she is no t  
k n o w l e d g e a b l e  e n o u g h  to .know h o w  bad  the  ene rgy  s i t u a t i o n  is. But  Mrs .  A and  her  
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family and friends have come up with "conceivable solutions" and she does not 
understand "why our representatives either can't or won't or don't  see what we see as 
the little people." Moreover,  those who publicly comment  on the issue have not done 
much themselves to improve the situation. 
I t h ink  we have the ab i l i ty  [in this  country] ,  and  tha t  we have  the know-bow,  and  if the money  has to be 
gotten,  I 'm sure it can be gotten.  1 have t o . . .  believe it 's a pol i t ical  thing: Tha t  they won't do any th ing  
abou t  it. 
Mrs. A believes that some politicians are honest and principled, and go to Washington 
with good intentions. 
But I t h ink  once  they get  there  the} become par t  o f . . .  the W a s h i n g t o n  scene, l t h ink  they become 
in t imida ted ,  and  then  become in t im ida to r s  . . . I t h ink  you  ei ther  jo in  the group,  or they don ' t  let you 
play in the g a m e . . .  
Mrs. A wants to believe them, but feels that realistically she cannot. They have 
promised too much and delivered too little, and have"an  awful lot of fence mending '~ 
to do. "It 's  not going to be easy for this country to totally believe in the men that they 
put into office." 
According to Mrs. A, the oil companies are taking advantage of an unexpected 
windfall and getting very rich. They did not realize what was happening, but now "they 
like what's happening and they're not going to do anything about it." They are holding 
back production and creating shortages to drive the price up. (Mrs. A sees some 
parallels in increases in coffee and sugar prices a few years ago.) Who stands to gain 
from that? 
You and  I - I know we won' t .  The oil compan ies  will  get much  richer. They are supposed  to be 
re invest ing so much  of this money  into c rea t ing  new forms of energy. I am sure with a good accoun tan t  
and  a couple  of p robab ly  very bright  people  a round  they can make  it look  on paper  that  they're  do ing  it. I 
TABLE 5 
Correlations Between Individual Q-Sorts 
and Core and Peripheral Viewpoint Profiles 
Viewpoints  
Mrs. A 0.82 0.68 0.62 0.66 
Mr. B 0.77 0.62 0.52 0.51 
Mrs. C 0.76 0.44 0.47 0.55 
Mr. D 0.75 0.58 0.57 0.62 
Responden t s  X X. 1 X.2 X.3 
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don't really think they will [do it] . . . 1 don't think they're really going to put that money back into 
production. 
The guy who works to keep his family together, put his kids through school he's the one who's going 
to suffer for it. The rich will only get richer and the poor will have Medicaid and welfare . . . The guy 
who works for a living won't be able to afford it . . . 
M r s .  A be l ieves  t h a t  e n e r g y  pr ices  a re  no t  on ly  excess ive ,  but  " r i d i c u l o u s . "  " B u t  they  
have  the  p e o p l e  by the  t h r o a t  - w h a t  are  you  g o i n g  to  do?"  
Mrs .  A ' s  s k e p t i c i s m  car r ies  over  to  the  news  med ia .  
I don't know how much of what the media tell us is the truth either. We're at the mercy of television and 
the newspapers and the radio, and you don't hear anything good anymore9 You just hear a prophet of 
doom. And it's depress ing. . ,  l think we are given to read and to listen to ~hat they want us to hear 
and read. 
T h e  resu l t  o f  th is  is that :  
People like us have become distrustful, have become fearful. They've scared us, they've frightened us 
into thinkingthat in another 10 15-20 years. God only kno~'s, we'll have no food, we'll have no energy. 
There won't be any th ing . . ,  l don't believe that it has to be that w a y . . .  I don't know the answer, I just 
know that there's no confidence in the government, and I think, l really believe, that we've been lied to so 
many times that it is just like the little boy that cried "wolf'. 
A t  a la ter  p o i n t  Mrs .  A pu t s  the  m a t t e r  m o r e  succinct ly :  
9 . . ignorance breeds fear. An,~ that's why people panic and get scared and don't think, and do things 
that they wouldn't do if they stopped and thought about it. It's because they just don't know what's really 
going on. 
M r s .  A r e p o r t s  t h a t  she  a n d  he r  h u s b a n d  h a v e  cut  b a c k  on  t h e i r  c o n s u m p t i o n  o f  
ene rgy ,  a n d  h a v e  d e c i d e d  to  sk ip  the i r  n o r m a l  s u m m e r  v a c a t i o n ,  a d r ive  o f  severa l  
h u n d r e d  mi les  r o u n d  t r ip .  Yet  she feels like s o m e t h i n g  o f  a sucker ,  wi th  p e o p l e  in 
W a s h i n g t o n ,  
9 . . having chauffeurs and flitting around the country9 And then you figure, well why should 1 [cut 
back]?9 . . You get to the point when you really feel, what the beck. lt's going to happen anyway, I might 
as well enjoy myself before it does. And that's a sick attitude9 I don't like t h a t . . .  I don't like to have my 
children hear me talk like that. And it frightens me when I hear my kids talk like that . . . 
T h i s  is a p r o f o u n d  conf l i c t  for  Mrs .  A, r o o t e d  in pa r t  in her  e x p e r i e n c e  as a ch i ld  
g r o w i n g  up d u r i n g  W o r l d  W a r  II. N o b o d y  c o m p l a i n e d  a b o u t  m a k i n g  sacr i f ices  then ;  
i ndeed ,  p e o p l e  t o o k  p r i d e  in m a k i n g  sacr i f ices  fo r  the  c o u n t r y .  But  " t h  e p r ide  in the  
c o u n t r y ' s  no t  t he re  t o d a y .  , . y o u  can ' t  have  p r ide  in s o m e t h i n g  y o u  d o n ' t  t rus t . "  
T h e  i n f e r e n c e  is i n e s c a p a b l e  t h a t  Mrs .  A feels a deep  but  f r u s t r a t e d  need  to  bel ieve in 
her  c o u n t r y  a n d  its l eade r s ,  a n d  to  " p u l l  t o g e t h e r  a n d  t ry  to  d o  s o m e t h i n g "  as she  o n c e  
did.  T h i s  need  is r e f l ec t ed  in he r  p r i n c i p a l  s u g g e s t i o n  fo r  d ea l i n g  wi th  the  ene rgy  
s i tua t ion :  
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 9  if  the s i tua t ion  is as despera te  as they lead us to believe, the only  way that  it's go ing  to get any  better,  
is to get eve rybody  to work  to do it better.  And  tha t  can only  come f rom the higher-ups.  Someth ing ' s  got 
to give jus t  to m a k e  people  want  to do it. I don ' t  know how. 
These comments  by Mrs. A illuminate her interpretation of a number of statements 
that figure prominently in the core viewpoint profile. Her comments  bearing on 
several other statements, though subsidiary from her viewpoint, are worth reviewing 
briefly. Mrs. A is upset by our continuing dependence on foreign sources of oil. As she 
puts it, "I hate to see foreign countries have such a power over us." She believes that we 
have the resources to increase production and reduce this dependency, but lack the 
political will. Enhanced production of coal and solar energy, increased refinery 
capacity, and energy-efficient designs in new buildings are among her "conceivable 
solutions." While nuclear power might also reduceour  dependence, she is frightened 
by the health and safety implications. She did not give the matter much thought until 
the accident at Three Mile Island and subsequent disclosures of  accidents at other 
plants. "I  don't  think that most people'fully understood what nuclear power was and 
how powerful, how dangerous, it can be." However, ~'I think if they [the authorities] 
have got their mind made up to go the way of nuclear power, they're going to do it, and 
I don't  think it means a hill of beans what the people think." 
Mr. B is a 37-year-old clergyman who lives in a South Atlantic state. He is most 
concerned about  the safety of his family and whether"our  lives are going to be able to 
continue as they have been - i f I  can go where I want to go and do the things I want to 
do." Mobility is a particularly important  matter  of  life-style because Mr. B's 
impending move to another part of the country is threatened by the gas shortage and 
the truckers' strike. What  is the source of the problem? 
W e l l . . .  1 don ' t  know. I t h ink  that ' s  the frust~'ating par t  of it. I don ' t  k n o w  whether  it's gove rnmen t  or 
whether  it's the oil companies ,  whether  it was jus t  poor  p l ann ing  for a long t ime  . . . .  I t h ink  the 
f rus t ra t ing  th ing  for me is the fact tha t  I don ' t  know what  to believe, and  I don ' t  know 1 can really t rust  
them when  they say some th ing  to me abou t  the energy s t u f f . . .  If  I could  see tha t  they were really 
address ing  the p r o b l e m . . .  It 's  jus t  so nebulous  and so uncertain9 
Coupled with this distrust and uncertainty is a sense of political inefficacy: 
9 . . I don ' t  rea l ly  feel l ike I have  any a r ena  to do a n y t h i n g  a b o u t  wha t ' s  go ing  on. It  seems to me tha t  
tho~e decis ions  are made  by a few people  and  I 'm not  real ly  convinced  tha t  they are made  for the good  of 
the people.  I t h ink  they ' re  made  for t he good of  the companies ,  of  those people  who  are go ing  to m a k e  all 
kinds of profi ts  off this  oil stuff9 
Mr. B has recently come to believe in the long-term potential of solar energy, and 
supports conservation as a matter  of personal and public action. But he describes 
nuclear safety and the disposal of radioactive wastes as a main concern, and his 
comments  on the accident at Three Mile Island stand out in terms of intensity. He was 
"angry" that such plants had been built in populated areas. And, 
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9 . . it seems like they had people in there who don't even know what they are doing. It also seems like the 
people who are supposedly able to regulate these things don't really have that much control over them, 
don't even have a whole lot of expertise in them. It's kind of shattering. 
M r s .  C is a 5 5 - y e a r - o l d  h o u s e w i f e  w h o  d o e s  v o l u n t e e r  w o r k  a n d  l ives in  a n  u p p e r - c l a s s  
n e i g h b o r h o o d  o f  a W e s t e r n  ci ty.  F o r  he r ,  " t h e  m o s t  i m p o r t a n t  t h i n g  is t h a t  new  
s o u r c e s  o f  e n e r g y  s h o u l d  be  d e v e l o p e d  as r a p i d l y  as p o s s i b l e . "  T h e s e  i n c l u d e  g a s o h o l ,  
oil  sha le ,  s o l a r  ene rgy ,  a n d  "a l l  o f  t h e  n a t u r a l  t h i n g s  we c a n  use . "  S h e  is " v e r y  m u c h  
o p p o s e d "  to  n u c l e a r  power :  
9 . . we're gonna poison the world for our next generations to come because there's no place to put the 
waste. I just wish that the?,, would close down the ones that they started already and use all the money that 
they are funneling into that program [in] these other programs. I think we're playing with God when we 
mess around with that stuff. 
M r s .  C be l i eves  t h a t  e n e r g y  p r i ces  a r e  probably fa i r  and.  r e a s o n a b l e  if t h e y  d o  n o t  
c o n t i n u e  to  go up ,  b u t  i f  p r o d u c t i o n  is b e i n g  w i t h h e l d  to  ra i se  pr ices ,  " ' t ha t ' s  w r o n g . "  " I  
a m  f o r t u n a t e  t h a t  we c a n  p a y  f o r  t h o s e  t h i n g s  w i t h  o u r  i n c o m e .  I feel  ve ry  b a d  fo r  
p e o p l e  w i t h  f ixed  i n c o m e s . "  A l t h o u g h  it is a p p a r e n t l y  n o t  n e c e s s a r y  fo r  f i n a n c i a l  
r e a s o n s ,  M r s .  C h a s  r e d u c e d  t h e  use  o f  h e r  a u t o m o b i l e  to  t h e  p o i n t  t h a t  she  p a y s  n o  
m o r e  fo r  g a s o l i n e ,  in  sp i t e  o f  r e c e n t  l a rge  i n c r e a s e s  in  t h e  pr ice .  M r s .  C p r o f e s s e s  
s k e p t i c i s m ,  
. . .  about everything and everybody anymore. 1 don't even like to hear news anymore, it's so 
discouraging. . .  I don't have much faith in the President anymore or [in] the oil companies9 
M r s .  C n o t e d  at  a l a t e r  p o i n t  in  t h e  i n t e r v i e w  t h a t  p e o p l e  in  he r  a r e a  p lace  m o r e  t r u s t  in 
loca l  l eaders .  " T h e y  feel  t h e y  h a v e  a l i t t le  m o r e  c o n t r o l  o v e r  t h e m . "  
M r .  D is a 2 7 - y e a r - o l d  h e a v y  c o n s t r u c t i o n  w o r k e r  w h o  l ives n e a r  a l a rge  
m e t r o p o l i t a n  a r e a  in a P l a i n s  s ta te .  F r o m  his v i e w p o i n t ,  
9 . . the most important thing is t h a t . . ,  changes need to be made to supply enough energy for the 
national growth. I think it's important to maintain the life-style of this country, which is probably one of 
the highest in the w o r l d . . .  With technology, if there's an honest attempt made by all parties involved, 
we can start relying more heavily on our renewable energy sources and start conserving our fossil 
f ue l s . . .  
T h e s e  n e e d s  a r e  r e l a t e d ,  in  Mr .  D ' s  v iew,  to  l a r g e r  p r o b l e m s  o f  s o c i a l  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  
s t a b i l i t y .  H e  be l i eves  t h a t  p e o p l e  " w i t h  t he  b ig  b u c k "  h a v e  t a k e n  a d v a n t a g e  o f  t he  
e n e r g y  s i t u a t i o n  a n d  u n d e r m i n e d  t h e  l i fe-styles ,  t he  s t a n d a r d s  o f  l iv ing,  of  t he  l o w e r  
a n d  m i d d l e  c lasses .  T h i s  p r o b l e m ,  
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9 . . has to be worked out or you're going to run into real problems . . . you [will] get a massive 
discontent of the greater portions of this country, which are an educated people. I mean it's not a bunch 
of ignorant masses that are going to take somebody's word for something9 They know better9 I think 
that's the only threat to this country as far as revolution, and if they disturb enough people at the same 
time due to something like th is . . .  
Mr. D re turned to this theme at the end of the interview when asked if he would like to 
make a summffry statement.  
Yes. 1 think the country is going to have to do it peaceably. They're going to have to take the whole 
society into account and treat them like men, 'cause if you try and do something and put the whole 
burden on the shoulders of the guy that's hurting the worst anyway, you're going to run into trouble. 
Mr. D. has little faith in government  "red tape and  bureaucracy."  He also has little 
faith that the major  oil companies  will accept reasonable  profits and avoid tak ing  "too 
big of a bite at somebody else's expense when it's just  totally unnecessary." He 
supports  his con ten t ion  that  energy price increases are contr ived by referring to his 
own observat ions made at j6bs a round  power plants  and oil refineries: " . . .  the 
reasons put  out for the increases in prices just  don ' t  j ibe with what I 'm seeing every 
day." 
To  Mr. D, nuclear  power plants  a re"po ten t i a l ly  harmful  to people" and there is no 
need for the government  to rush them on line. 
They're going to have a bad accident and they're going to have everything out: "O. K., we're going to shut 
these down." So all of a sudden you've got all these things just sitting there, monuments to nothing. 
He expected someth ing  like the incident  at Three  Mile Is land would happen,  and he 
had heard o f " a t  least a half  a dozen other incidents that never hit the news" from 
fellow cons t ruc t ion  workers. Mr. D believes that  a large n u m b e r  of small, decen- 
tralized genera t ing  sources is a much more reliable way to go, despite resistance by 
government  and industry.  The local power company  apparent ly  frustrated his a t tempt  
to put  up a small  wind genera tor  and  tie it into the line between the meter and  the 
breaker box in his new home. 
These interviews are intended to clarify individual  interpretat ions  of the principal  
s tatements in the core viewpoint  and  to suggest some of the origins of these 
interpretat ions.  It  is beyond the scope of this paper  to a t tempt  an evaluat ion  of the 
opin ions  volunteered in terms of their g round ing  in the facts of the current  context  and 
the values that have been assimilated into Amer ican  culture through centuries of 
experience. Two observat ions can be made by way of conclusion,  however. One is that  
these opinions  cannot  be easily dismissed as unrealis t ic  or unwor thy  inputs  to policy 
p l ann ing  and evalua t ion  [8]. Ano the r  is that  for p romot iona l  purposes, the realism 
and moral  worth of these opinions  is a secondary considerat ion.  These opinions,  to the 
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extent they are shared, are important factors in shaping the success or failure of any 
attempt to mobilize the public behind an energy plan or to elicit voluntary compliance 
with energy policies already enacted. 
VI. The Evolution of Viewpoints 
In this section we consider the pattern of evolution of citizen viewpoints, both past and 
prospective. 
Short-Term 
More than a year ago, a pilot study using a similar Q-sample in a Midwestern city 
revealed three public viewpoints on energy policy. They emphasized: 
(l) Energy conservation and environmental protection, with little faith in either 
experts or the federal government. 
(2) Energy production increases, maintenance of living standards, and rejection of 
higher energy prices, with distrust of the federal government and the energy industries. 
(3) Rejection of government intervention, faith in the market, and the need for 
higher energy prices, coupled with distrust of the public. 
According to an independent estimate, the second viewpoint comprised about 
two-thirds to three-quarters of the national population, while the first and third 
viewpoints included about one-eighth and one-tenth, respectively [9]. Although the 
pilot study is far from conclusive, it does provide a suggestive benchmark. 
Based on similarities with the current results, the second viewpoint in the pilot study 
appears to be the common antecedent of both the core viewpoint X and the peripheral 
viewpoints X. 1 and X.3; the first viewpoint appears to be the direct antecedent of the 
X.2 viewpoint; and the third (or market-oriented) viewpoint appears to have 
disappeared as a distinctive, shared viewpoint. To be sure, a number of the 
respondents in the current study sorted certain statements (App. 28, 3, 45, 29, 26) in 
ways that can be interpreted as market-oriented, and six respondents provided a 
relatively consistent pattern in this direction. But the market-oriented perspectives of 
these six are subordinate to other perspectives, and the distances among their Q-sorts 
are relatively large. One is classified as a member of X, another as a member of X.2, 
and the remaining four are scattered among the unclassified peripheral respondents. 
Based on differences between the earlier results and the current results, it appears 
that health, safety, and environmental concerns have intensified relative to others over 
time; and that opinions on nuclear power have intensified and shifted in the direction 
of opposition, particularly opposition to the siting of new nuclear plants in nearby 
areas. The most plausible interpretation is that these changes represent the impact of 
the incident at Three Mile Island, which focused and sustained attention in the news 
for several weeks. (Quite unintentionally, the Q-sorts were obtained in the five-week 
period immediately following the incident.) 
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Representatives of the core viewpoint are now strongly opposed to new nuclear 
power plants in the areas where they live, having been impressed, presumably, by the 
impact of the incident on people like themselves in the Harrisburg area. (See the 
comments  on the incident in the interview summaries above.) Apparently, nuclear 
power is now perceived less as a source of energy that contributes to domestic energy 
production and living standards than as a threat to public health, safety, and the 
environment. Though representatives of the X.1 viewpoint are less opposed to new 
nuclear power plants in their areas than are the representatives of the core viewpoint, 
they are now noticeably more concerned about public health and safety. The 
representatives of the X.3 viewpoint appear  to be unaffected. Their shared viewpoint 
remains a rough approximat ion to the second viewpoint in the pilot study. 
In short, the incident at Three Mile Island appears to have precipitated movement 
of the second pilot-study viewpoint in the direction of the first, and mitigated the 
differences between tlae two. At the same time, the issue of nuclear siting raised by the 
incident appears to have split the second viewpoint into two peripheral variations. In a 
rough and approximate  way, this pattern of evolution appears  to account for the 
principal differences between the results of the two studies. 
The impact of the incident at Three Mile Island as reconstructed here may dissipate 
in relative intensity as Three Mile Island recedes further into the past and other events 
dominate public attention. The unstructured interviews summarized above provide 
some preliminary indications. Although strong opinions were still expressed in 
opposition to nuclear power in June 1979, other issues were deemed more important.  
Longer-Term 
Other themes in the core and peripheral viewpoints - economic insecurities (if not 
hardships), distrust, disbelief, disaffection, and undertones of moral  outrage - have 
tended to persist over several years. This persistence is rooted in recurring events, 
particularly sustained energy price increases and intermittent shortages, and state- 
ments about  them circulated through the national news media. These are the principal 
ways in which the energy situation enters into the experience of individual citizens and 
to some extent coordinates their viewpoints [10]. 
A struggle over national energy policy is conducted through the news media because 
the principal factions of the policy-making elite have been unable to agree among 
themselves on a number  of key issues, despite their access to expert opinion and 
analyses [11]. Under these circumstances, each faction perceives an opportunity to 
advance its policy positions and interests by appeals to a larger audience. Diagnoses 
and prescriptions circulated to the public through the news media by one faction tend 
to be contradicted by one or more of the others, who sometimes also attempt to 
discredit the opposition directly. Moreover,  some statements circulated for public 
consumption are perceived to be contradicted by observations and interpretations 
that citizens can make on their own. For  example, the assertion that we are faced with 
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a profound crisis tends to be undermined when projected shortages do not materialize; 
and the localized and transitory shortages that have occurred tend to be interpreted in 
part as deliberate attempts to force price increases [12]. Meanwhile, everyone has 
experienced increases in gasoline and utility bills, but few perceive significant progress 
toward such widely acclaimed goals as reducing our dependence on foreign sources of 
oil. 
The short- term impacts on the public are not exclusively or even primarily 
economic. To be sure, poor  and fixed-income households have suffered economic 
hardships. But middle- and upper-income households so far have been able to 
accommodate  increased energy costs with relatively minimal strain on household 
budgets, and energy shortages so far have been localized and temporary for all income 
classes. One important impact is the calling into question of prior beliefs. For 
example: 
- Someone must understand the situation. But why do the experts disagree? 
We have a lot of know-how in this country. But why can't  we soh, e the problem? 
- We've managed so far. But what's going to happen in the future? 
- I pay more for energy now. But why doesn't this increase energy supplies? 
- Americans pull together in a crisis. But is there really a crisis? 
- I 'm ready to do my part. But am I being taken for a sucker if I do? 
- Others have been affected the same way I have been. But why don't  they listen to 
us? 
This is a government of the people. But does it protect the interests of people like 
me? 
Another impact is to question the preferences built into individual life-styles: 
- What  will I have to give up? 
Still another is to question previous loyalties: 
- Whom can I trust? 
Where such questions are difficult to resolve at the personal level, anxieties and 
insecurities cumulate and weaken the constraints of reason and conscience. This 
increases the demand for emotionally satisfying rather than realistic or just solutions, 
One such emotionally satisfying "solution" is scapegoating, which provides 
temporary  relief of the symptoms (catharsis) [13]. It is no accident that personal 
insecurities arising from the energy situation (and other sources as well) are displaced 
on the President, the government generally, the oil and gas industry, other energy 
industries, and the like. For  one thing, they figure most prominently in the energy 
debate in Washington, as covered in the news over the last several years. For  another, 
they have consistently focused and refocused the debate on energy price increases. 
That  energy prices should increase is largely a matter  of consensus in Washington. 
What  has been at issue is: Who should administer the price increases, at what  rate, 
and who should dispose of the proceeds? The principal options are government and 
business (through reliance on "market"  processes). The energy price debate encour- 
ages the assumption that government and business are to blame: citizens tend to view 
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energy price increases as the problem, not the solution [14]. Government  and business, 
in short, are both highly visible and plausible targets. 
The effects are multiple and reinforcing. Responsibility and blame are focused on 
government and business. This further undermines trust in government and business, 
already in doubt before the 1973-1974 oil embargo. Distrust further reinforces the 
tendency to discount statements about the nation's energy situation from these 
sources, sometimes without examining them carefully. People fall back on their own 
observations and interpretations in an at tempt to make sense of the situation. But this 
selective focus leaves many key questions unresolved, and insecurities are further 
exacerbated. For the respondents included in this study, whatever hopes remain for a 
better future appear  to be displaced on solar energy and to a lesser degree consumer 
organizations. Both solar energy and consumer organizations so far have assumed a 
relatively peripheral role in the national energy debate. 
The symptoms of such adjustments appear  to be manifest in the viewpoints 
explored in this study and in previous studies. The energy situation viewed from the 
grass roots is indeed different from the energy situation as seen from Washington. The 
political problem so far is less the existence of these differences and the cumulation of 
insecurities than our inability to deal with them constructively. At some level, 
however, the cumulation of insecurities interferes with constructive problem solving. 
A Look Ahead 
What changes in viewpoints might occur over the remainder of 19797 The most 
probable projection is further intensification of insecurities. Reassurances, pessimistic 
forecasts, and additional plans and exhortations from Washington or from corporate 
headquarters will probably have little effect on the evolution of public viewpoints, 
unless they depart substantially from previous announcements and make sense in 
terms of the direct experience of individual citizens. Both practice and systematic 
inquiry indicate that propaganda and other representations that are inconsistent with 
predispositions tend to have little effect, unless supported by something more than 
words. Among the key predispositions in this instance are distrust and disbelief. 
Whatever is said and done in Washington or corporate headquarters, the price 
increases now originating in part in the Middle East will generate additional tension, 
and this will be exacerbated by the impending recession. 
Some changes are possible, however. Unanticipated events like the incident at 
Three Mile Island cannot be ruled out in nuclear policy or in energy policy generally. 
Another  possibility is that the early stages of the 1980 Presidential election 
campaign will surface a person who can tap the existing tension and insecurities, 
satisfy the needs for credibility and reassurance, and mobilize the public behind new 
energy policies that could be constructive or destructive. If  one "solution" to the 
emotional demands of the situation is scapegoating, another may be blind sub- 
servience to a leader who appears to satisfy those demands. 
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Still another possibility is that personal insecurities, social tension, and a general 
sense of crisis may be deliberately exacerbated by word or deed, on the expectation 
that citizens and organized groups would therefore subordinate their perceived self- 
interests and pull together in concerted (and perhaps desperate) action. Whether 
something like this has already occurred in energy policy is difficult to determine on 
the evidence available. In any case, agreement on major energy issues has been realized 
during short-term emergencies such as the 1973 -1974 oil embargo; and recent gasoline 
shortages on the West and East Coasts have been viewed as a major promotional  
opportunity. 
Finally, there is a possibility of a concerted attempt to deflect responsibility and 
blame for the energy situation away from the principals in the domestic policy debate 
and toward alternative targets overseas, particularly the oil-exporting countries. 
Whatever the consequences for domestic politics, this tactic entails an increased risk of 
curtailments in the global supply of oil and an increased risk of armed conflict. 
Advocates of nonviolent action may be partially reassured that the public for the time 
being is predisposed against the threat or use of military force (see App. 2). 
The problem of projecting short-term movements in citizen viewpoints is particu- 
larly difficult in the current situation. On the one hand, heightened personal 
insecurities, social tension, and distrust are destabilizing. The inner constraints of 
conscience and reason have been weakened, and there exists an enormous amount  of 
emotional energy that can be tapped and channeled in many directions. On the other 
hand, the political stalemate in Washington, which accounts in part for the emotional 
climate, is rooted in perceptual and political rigidities that have persisted and 
intensified over several years. Whether the stalemate will be broken or circumvented, 
and if so how, are the key uncertainties. 
VII. Conclusion 
Our energy problems are at least as much perceptual, political, and moral as they are 
economic and technical. The cost of our present inability to solve these problems 
cannot be measured in dollars or BTU's alone. The cost includes not only distrust and 
disbelief, which complicate the adoption of policies that might otherwise be 
acceptable; it also includes declining confidence in our institutions of government, 
law, and politics. Founded on moral consensus, these institutions are prerequisites for 
the orderly conduct of the myriad transactions that take place in a modern society. 
These transactions include, of course, the product ion and exchange of goods and 
services, and the development and dissemination of technical innovations. Declining 
confidence in public institutions is much more than a minor externality: it could turn 
out to be the major cost of the energy crisis. 
To minimize the cost of the transition to a sustainable energy future, the immediate 
task is to reduce the rising levels of social tension and personal insecurities. These 
increase the risks of emotionally satisfying but destructive "solutions." The task is 
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complicated by widespread public opposition to the major energy policy alternatives 
advanced so far. It is further complicated by distrust of leaders identified with those 
alternatives, distrust sufficiently pervasive to render ineffective their future promo- 
tional efforts [15]. Although payoffs that are tangible and visible to the public might 
eventually dissipate these barriers, the major policies now in place or proposed are 
not expected to realize such payoffs in the short run. Restoration of trust and 
confidence is a long-run proposition. 
We need to rethink energy policies in both the public and private sectors, taking into 
account the viewpoints that exist at the grass roots. One possibility for circumventing 
the existing perceptual and political barriers and providing tangible and visible 
payoffs in the short run is a decentralized strategy [16]. The federal government might 
encourage local communities to deal with certain aspects of the energy situation, 
particularly energy conservation and the implementation of small-scale technologies 
to utilize renewable resources like solar energy [17]. Our results show a significant 
degree of public consensus on the need to develop renewable resources like solar 
energy (6_ 1), and to provide"better  information about how the energy crisis affects me 
and my community, and what we can do about it" (18) (see Table 2). 
In any case, those who are influential in energy policy, and who would therefore be 
the prime targets in an eruption of moral outrage, have the largest stake in the 
cultivation of alternative strategies. 
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Notes 
1 On Q-techniques, see W. Stephenson.  The Study o[ Behavior: Q-Technique and lts Methodology 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953); S. R. Brown, "Intensive analysis in political research," 
Political Methodology, I (Winter, 1974), pp. 1-25: and a text by S. R. Brown forthcoming from the 
Yale University Press. Recent developments are reviewed in Operant Subjectivity, edited by S. R. 
Brown at Kent State University, Kent, Ohio 44242. 
2 A theoretical framework is used to sample the universe of relevant statements, and not to impose one 
set of meanings (the investigators') on the statements to the exclusion of others. T he framework used to 
develop this Q-sample is based on eight value categories (power, respect, rectitude, affection, wealth, 
well-being, skill, enlightenment) and five categories of the problem-orientation (goals, trends, 
conditions, projections, policy alternatives). The last category, policy alternatives, was used twice. 
Each of the 8 X 6 = 48 conceptual possibilities is represented by one statement in the Q-sample. As 
reproduced in the Appendix,  the columns from left to right represent the value categories in the order 
listed above; the rows from top to bot tom represent the categories of the problem-orientat ion in the 
order listed above. For example, statement 8_.(We should do whatever we can to make our jobs and 
incomes less dependent on foreign oil) can ~be found in the first row and column. It formulates a power 
goal, reduced dependence. For an explication of these categories, see H. D. Lasswell, .4 Pre- View of 
Policy Sciences (New York: Elsevier, [971), Chs. 2 and 3. 
3 The standard text is P. H. A. Sheath and R. R. Sokal, Numerical Taxonomy: The Principles and 
Practice of Numerical Classification (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman. [973). See also K. D. Bailey, 
"'Cluster Analysis," in Sociological Methodology 1975 (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1974), Chapter 2, 
edited by D. R. Heise; and R. K. Blashfield and M. S. Aldenderfer. "Whe literature on cluster 
analysis," Muhivariate Behavioral Research, 13 (July 1978), pp. 271-295. 
4 Sneath and Sokal, op. cit., p. 222. 
5 An analogy illustrates the point. To distinguish apples, oranges, and other kinds of fruit, it is sufficient 
to draw a small, diverse sample that includes at least a few specimens of each. A large, random sample 
is superfluous for this purpose, a l though essential for estimating the proportions of pre-specified types 
in the population from sample data. There are no sampling distributions to assist the interpretation of 
cluster results, even if random sampling procedures are used in data collection. 
6 On this point see the interview summaries in the next section and Bee Angell and Associates, Inc.. "A 
Qualitative Study of Consumer  Attitudes Toward Energy Conservation" [November,  1975), prepared 
for the Office of Energy Conservat ion and Environment,  Federal Energy Administration. In verbaxim 
comments  made in unstructured group discussions, people tend to support  their opinions on energy 
issues with first-hand observations or with second-hand observations from relatives and acquaint- 
ances. Statements  and actions by the President and business leaders are not consistently used for the 
same purpose. On the contrary, they tend to be rejected explicitly. 
7 All interviews were conducted by one of the two authors  or both. The interview with Mrs. A took place 
in her home on June  19. The  interviews with Mr. B, Mrs. C, and Mr. D were done by long-distance 
telephone on June  28. During the same period we interviewed four other respondents who were among 
the best representatives of the peripheral viewpoints. These interviews are not summarized here 
because of space limitations. 
8 For example, both public opinions and expert opinions are selective, but in different ways. The 
tendency of the former to rely on first-hand observations in the immediate surroundings is not 
necessarily less reliable (according to conventions of evidence) than the tendency of the latter to rely on 
observations from around the country or the globe that are many times removed from direct 
experience, aggregated, and filtered through a number  of interested parties. The Congress has 
persistently questioned the dependability and the credibility of the information used in national energy 
policy planning and evaluation. See, for example, the Congressionally mandated report of the 
Professional Audit and Review Team, Activities of the Qffice of Energy In/ormation and Analysis. 
Federal Energy Administration (December 5, 1978). Moreover, the principle of government of, by, 
and for the people is at least as strong in our cultural heritage as the principle that systematic inquiry 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































9 The results are reported in R. D. Brunner, "'Citizen Viewpoints on Energy: Richmond, Indiana" 
(March, 1978). The independent estimate was made by the former Director of Marketing Research, 
Office of Energy Conservation and Environment, Federal Energy Administration. It was based on 
statements in the Q-sample that distinguished the three viewpoints and were similar to items that 
had been included in a number of national sample surveys sponsored by the FEA. 
10 This analysis incorporates propositions from a number of studies of public opinion and mass 
movements, including several classics: W. Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: The Free Press, 
1965 ed.); H. D. Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics (New York: Viking Press, 1960 ed.), 
especially Ch. X; H. D. Lasswell, World Politics and Personal Insecurity(New York: The Free Press, 
1965 ed.), especially Part III; and H. D. Lasswell and A. Kaplan, Power andSociety (New tlaven: 
Yale University Press, 1950), especially the chapter on symbols. For a brief analysis of the interplay of 
symbols, conditions, and public opinion in the 1973 1974 oil embargo, see R. D. Brunner, "An 
'intentional' alternative in public opinion research," American Journal o f  Political Science, XXI 
(August, 1977), pp. 454-459. 
11 On the diversity of interests among the policy-making elites see "Industry's views on the critical 
choices," New York Times(April 20, 1977) and the numerous published critiques of major Presidential 
energy initiatives such as the National Energy Plan introduced in April 1977. A glimpse of the politics 
of energy policy planning can be found in L. H. Lapham, "The energy debacle," Harper's (August, 
1977), pp. 58ff. Ideological differences amqng energy policy experts are a persistent theme in thework 
of A. B. Lo~ins, particularly "'Cost risk benefit assessments in energy policy," George Washington 
University Law Review, 45 (August, 1977), pp. 911 943. 
12 Comments on press coverage of projected natural gas shortages can be found in R. M orris, "Whatever 
happened to the natural gas crisis?" Columbia Journalism Review (March/April ,  1976), pp. 32ff. See 
also, E. M. Kennedy, "Fuel price decontrol is a mistake," Challenge (May-June,  1979), pp. 59-60. 
13 Scapegoating is not limited to members of the general public. See J. Reston, "Who's to bl~/me?" New 
York Times (May 13, 1979), p. E21, and a letter in response from W. D. Burnham published in the 
Times(May 23, 1979), p. A26. 
14 Consider the following by J, S. Milstein, "How Consumers Feel About Eriergy: Attitudes and 
Behavior During the Winter and Spring of 1976-77" (U.S. Department of Energy, June, 1977), p. 11: 
People do not want to pay higher prices for energy because higher energy prices are the problem to 
a majority of people. Higher energy prices are of great concern to people because they are 
personally experienced weekly and monthly through gasoline and utility bills. Thus people are 
baffled by proposals to solve the energy problem by raising energy prices to consumers: How can 
you solve high prices by making them even higher? 
15 More precisely, the problem is symbol inflation. In parallel with monetary inflation, it is a case of too 
many words and numbers chasing too few verifiable meanings from the viewpoint of the "buyer." The 
effect is to render ineffective the principal instrument of policy in the short run, the manipulation of 
symbols. Compare Mrs. A's comments on the "boy crying wolf.'" 
16 Strategy is used here in the sense of A. M. Rivlin: A general principle which, if widely accepted, 
provides a stable and constructive context for the consideration of specific plans designed to 
implement it. See "Social Policy: Alternative Strategies for the Federal Government" (W. S. 
Woytinsky Lecture No. 3, Institute of Public Policy Studies and Department of Economics, The 
University of Michigan, 1973). 
17 A small number of communities around the country already have achieved remarkable results through 
local energy initiatives with very little national publicity. See the Hearings on Local Energy Policies, 
May 22, June 5 and 9, 1978, of the Energy and Power Subcommittee, under Chairman J. D. Dingell, 
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives (S erial No. 95 135). 
An analysis of the hearings and other sources can be found in R. D. Brunner (1980), ~'Decentralized 
Energy Policies," Public Policy 28:71-91. 
